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 1. Introduction
   Although organized crime has no doubt been a feature of New Zealand 
society since the adoption of British sovereign law in 1840, recognition of 
such crime as a specific and ongoing problem is less than ten years old. In 
1987, as a result of concern that certain Asian immigrants may have crimi-
nal connections in their home countries, the coordinated gathering of intel-
ligence about organized crime began. Three years later, a fulltime orga-
nized criminal intelligence officer was established at Police National Head-
quarters. In 1991, as an extension of this, the first dedicated Asian crime 
units were created. 
   In Australia, where a National Crime Authority was set up to fight 
organized crime in 1984, relevant criminal activity has been statutorily de-
fined as that which involves: two or more offenders, sophisticated methods, 
offences often committed in conjunction with other like offences, and which 
includes a variety of specified crimes such as fraud, illegal drug dealing, 
extortion, and violence (Broome, 1996). 
   In New Zealand, the police definition of organized crime is somewhat 
similar and contains four essential elements:
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I. The criminal activity must be continuing. 
   2. The activity must involve profit. 
   3. The activity must involve a group of persons. 
   4. The activity must be accompanied by the use of fear and violence 
    (Fiso, 1997: pers. comm.) 
   As in Australia, the New Zealand police definition thus restricts itself 
principally to the activities of the underworld. Ostensibly ` respectable' or-
ganizations, such as commercial and governmental entities, though involved 
in crime that is `organized' through activities such as fraud, tax evasion, 
misappropriation of funds, etc., are excluded. In New Zealand, the prosecu-
tion of such ` white collar' offences is normally conducted by a special agency 
known as the Serious Fraud Office (see Newbold and Ivory, 1993). Since 
the current paper relies heavily on intelligence supplied by the police, it is 
the police definition which will be used. 
         2. The Nature and Extent of Organized Crime 
          in New Zealand
   A. Context 
   In order to understand the manner in which organized crime has 
emerged in New Zealand, it is first necessary to describe the geographical, 
historical and social context in which such crime takes place. For as we 
shall see, the prospects for survival of organized crime in this country are 
very much affected by situational factors. 
   New Zealand is a South Pacific nation of 3.6 million people. It con-
sists of two major islands: the North Island and the South Island. Three-
quarters of the population live in the North Island; 900,000 of them in the 
country's largest city, Auckland. The capital, Wellington, is the second-
largest, with 325,000. The nation's population is principally New Zealand 
European (75 percent), but around ten percent of New Zealanders identify 
as Maori, the native people of the land. Other major ethnic groups include 
other European (4.6 percent), Pacific Islander (3.8 percent) and Asian (two 
percent). 
   An important feature of New Zealand's geography is its isolation. It 
has no contiguous borders with any other country and is approximately 1200 
miles from its nearest neighbour, Australia. It is due to this remoteness that 
the country was one of the last major landmasses colonized by Europeans, 
and this same isolation which makes the smuggling of illegal items and 
substances into it difficult. The fact that it has only one fully international
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airport, in Auckland, compounds the difficulty of smuggling. Although the 
New Zealand coastline is large, the importance of the fishing industry and 
the threat imposed by poaching from foreign trawlers, means that policing 
of territorial waters is extensive. In addition, New Zealand's inshore seas 
can be very rough and small boats often founder. In 1979, for example, an 
attempt to smuggle two to three kilograms of heroin ashore by yacht was 
foiled when the boat was wrecked on the South Island's rugged west coast. 
   New Zealand has a national police force, headed by a commissioner. 
Numbering 6500 sworn personnel, the force is well trained, professionally 
organized and well paid. Recruits, who normally require at least four years 
of high school education, are trained for six months at a residential college 
on a salary of $27,164. Once sworn, the salary increases to $37,803. It is 
partly because of the small size of New Zealand, because of its unified 
police force, and because of good pay and high professional standards within 
the force, that institutionalized corruption is virtually unknown in the mod-
ern New Zealand Police. The fact that New Zealand policemen will break 
the law to enforce the law, but will not not take bribes, is often lamented 
within country's criminal fraternity. The  uncorruptibility of the New Zealand 
Police is an important factor in crime control because, as other papers in 
this volume demonstrate, organized crime can never flourish without the 
protection of a crooked administration.
   B. Crime in New Zealand 
   Like many other western nations, crime rates in New Zealand have 
risen dramatically in the last 25 years. Since 1970, the rate of police-re-
ported homicide per 100,000 mean population has doubled, burglary has 
trebled, and robbery has grown more than ten-fold. Drug offences grew 
from 408 reported offences in 1970 to 22,031 in 1996. In the past ten years, 
however, the rate of reported drug offending has only grown by twelve 
percent, and has virtually stabilized since 1990. 
   A considerable proportion of the reported increases in crime in New 
Zealand have been attributed to the end of the postwar boom, and deepen-
ing economic recession following the oil shocks of the 1970s and the 
sharemarket crash of 1987 (see Newbold, 1992: 86-87). Unemployment 
rates grew from 1.4 percent of the labour force in 1971 to peak at 10.5 
percent in 1991. With the commencement of economic recovery in the 1990s, 
however, unemployment has fallen to about eight percent. Perhaps not co-
incidentally, not only has drug offending leveled off in the current decade
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but so too has robbery, while burglary and homicide rates have dropped 
sharply. 
   Because drug offending, as we shall see, forms the mainstay of much 
organized criminal activity in New Zealand, we need to examine this area a 
little more closely before proceeding.
   C. Emergence of the Drug Problem 
   Prior to the 1970s, trafficking and use of illegal drugs were inconse-
quential in New Zealand. For decades there had been a few prosecutions 
every year for smoking opium, principally involving older Chinese. But 
this was seen as of little significance to larger society. Opium smoking fig-
ures were not even isolated in police statistics until 1959. Cannabis offend-
ing first appeared as a separate item in the police annual report of 1962, but 
between then and 1966, only an average of six cannabis offences were re-
ported every year. 
   The firstsign of change took place in 1967, when 75 cannabis offences 
were reported. By 1970, the number of reported cannabis offences had more 
than doubled. They doubled again the following year, to 300 offences. Pub-
lic alarm about the change in recreational drug use patterns led to the com-
missioning of two committees of inquiry, in 1970 and 1973, in order to 
search for a solution. 
   The genesis of the drug problem had nothing to do with organized 
crime; rather it was linked to popular culture. LSD and marijuana had be-
come popular in the United States, then Britain, in the 1960s. Associated 
with contemporary musical and fashion trends, with the civil rights and 
anti-Vietnam War movements and with the growing `Hippie' culture of the 
time, drug use was part of the rebellious rejection of traditional values which 
swept the Western nations in the decade. Isolated as it is, the fashion of 
`pot' smoking and ` acid tripping' came to New Zealand late in the 1960s, 
transmitted mostly via music, film, print, radio and television. 
    At this time, hard addictive drugs were rare. TheNew Zealand Police 
first commented on the growing drug problem in their annual report of 1973 
(Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives G.6 1973: 17-
18). Quantities of LSD had begun entering the country in the late 1960s, but 
it wasn't until 1972 that the drug problem seemed significant enough to 
warrant specific action by the police. In that year a National Drug Intelli-
gence Bureau was set up to try to coordinate operations and intelligence 
between the departments of police, health and customs.
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   Between 1972 and 1975, the number of drug offences reported in New 
Zealand trebled. Marijuana and LSD were still the principal drugs o f choice, 
however, and interest in the opiates was minimal. But by the middle of the 
1970s, a change in drug offending patterns was becoming visible. Firstly, 
responding to market demands, police-reported cannabis dealing grew  dra-
matically, more than quadrupling in the years 1972-1974. Secondly, by 1974 
large-scale cannabis smuggling had commenced. By 1975 the police knew 
that organized criminal networks were operating and using sophisticated 
methods to import drugs from Southeast Asia. Initially, interest was re-
stricted to high-grade cannabis known as ` buddha sticks', however in 1975, 
with LSD usage in decline, Southeast Asian heroin began to appear in sig-
nificant quantities. As police pressure increased, large busts were made and 
sentences of up to eleven years were awarded for marijuana importing. Re-
alizing that heroin offered fewer risks and greater profits than did mari-
juana, drug traffickers changed their focus. By 1977, buddha sticks had 
started to become rare in New Zealand and had been replaced by high grade 
imported heroin. 
                  3. The 'Mr Asia' Gang 
   New Zealand's most active organizedcriminal gang in the 1970s be-
came known as the ` Mr Asia' gang. The Mr Asia gang is significant be-
cause it represents the only time in history that an organized criminal enter-
prise has operated on a major scale in New Zealand. As we shall see, factors 
outlined earlier relating to New Zealand's geographical and social context, 
frustrated the gang's attempts to control the country's drug trade. 
   In February 1974 Terry Clark, alias Sinclair, a 30-year old petty crimi-
nal serving a five year sentence for burglary, was released from Wi Tako 
Prison near Wellington. Short of cash and wanting to make money fast, he 
moved to Auckland where he agreed to meet a courier who had just arrived 
from Bangkok, Thailand, with a large consignment of buddha sticks in her 
luggage. The arrangement was for Clark to drive her from Auckland airport 
to the city. Not far from the airport, however, Clark had arranged for his car 
to be stopped by one containing men masquerading as detectives. Pulling 
over to the side of the road he shouted at the courier to run for it. She obeyed 
and once she was hidden safely in the bushes, Clark and his accomplices 
drove off with the drugs (Clark, pers. comm.). 
   Armed with capital, Clark now began importing his own marijuana 
and heroin, travelling first to Bangkok alone to make purchases, then using
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couriers. By reinvesting most of his profits immediately in further ship-
ments, Clark soon became extremely wealthy. Ruthless and ambitious, by 
mid-1975 he was already developing plans to control the entire illicit drug 
trade in New Zealand, and to franchise areas out to various distributors 
(Clark, pers. comm.). Later his scheme xtended to the whole of Australasia. 
   Late in 1974 Clark had met Marty Johnstone, a 23 year oldAucklander 
who since 1973 had been importing Southeast Asian marijuana by sea 
through the Royal Dutch Orient Line  (Hall, 1981: 32). Clark and Johnstone 
formed a partnership and together with Johnstone's contacts and some of 
Clark's former prison friends, the two began importing on a large scale. In 
1975, both men were arrested on separate charges: Clark with importing 
half a kilo of heroin and Johnstone with possessing marijuana for supply. In 
the end, Johnstone was acquitted while Clark jumped bail and began work-
ing from Australia. Extradited to New Zealand to face trial in 1977, he also 
was eventually acquitted. 
   As his business boomed and his profits multiplied, Clark became richer 
and more powerful than ever. By paying a retainer of $22,000 a year to the 
Australian Federal Narcotics Bureau, Clark gained a degree of criminal 
immunity in Australia and was also able to buy information from the bu-
reau at around $10,000 a time (Kwitny, 1987: 249-50). Late in 1977, be-
cause he saw them as becoming a threat o security, Clark ordered the mur-
ders of two of his workers, Greg 011ard and Julie Thielman. Their bodies 
were never- found (Hall, 1981: 52-54). The following year, because police 
told Clark that his worker Harry Lewis had talked when arrested, Clark 
took him for a drive and shot him in the head. And in 1979,  after police sold 
Clark tapes in which his workers Doug and Isobel Wilson could be heard 
informing on him, they too were murdered. 
    By 1979, Clark's wealth andpower must have seemed unassailable - 
at least, to himself. Worth hundreds of millions of dollars, he now headed 
one of the biggest heroin syndicates in the world. Much of his money was 
laundered through the corrupt Nugan Hand Bank, which also had links with 
a number of retired senior American military officers (Kwitny, 1987). Clark 
himself was busy attempting to open up new markets in the United States 
and Europe. Clark and Marty Johnstone, although operating somewhat sepa-
rately at this time, continued to maintain contact. But Johnstone was a flam-
boyant character, lacking the calculated organizing flair of Clark. By 1979, 
Johnstone's business was failing and he was beginning to take orders from 
Clark.
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    Since 1976, the New Zealand Police Commissioner Ken Burnside had 
been talking about a ` Mr Big' who was taking over the country's organized 
crime (Auckland Star, 14 October 1976). By 1979, the existence of a leg-
endary `Mr Asia' (a title wrongly attributed to Marty Johnstone) was public 
knowledge. Clark saw the publicity that Johnstone was attracting as an in-
creasing threat o business. In May 1979, soon after the Wilsons' deaths, 
Clark flew to London. There he was joined by a number of his workers. 
Johnstone travelled between Asia and Europe, working on new markets for 
Clark, but his erratic lifestyle, combined with some bad business decisions, 
had left him with debts in excess of $A2 million. As time went on, Johns 
tone became an increasing liability to the organization and Clark decided 
he had to go. On 9 October 1979, Johnstone was taken north from London 
by two of Clark's men on the pretext of a business trip. On the way he was 
shot in the head and his weighted body, with hands severed, was dumped in 
a disused, water-filled quarry in Lancashire. 
   It was this event which sealed the fate of the Mr Asia gang. Soon after 
Clark had arrived in London, the Wilsons' bodies had been found in 
Melbourne, Australia. A number of the organization's members were al-
ready serving prison sentences and police in New Zealand, Australia, the 
United Kingdom, Singapore and Thailand now had extensive dossiers on 
the gang's activities. These countries eventually provided Britain's Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions with 1500 pages of evidence in the trial which 
followed (Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives G.6 
1980: 4). Johnstone's death did not go unnoticed for Iong either. Just a few 
days after the killing, recreational scuba divers chanced upon Johnstone's 
body under water in the quarry. In the Panic that ensued members of the 
gang soon began to talk and as arrests began, more started to crack. Clark 
himself was apprehended inNovember 1979. In July 1981, after an investi-
gation lasting more than a year and a 121-day trial, Clark and seven other 
gang members were sentenced to prison terms ranging from five years to 
life imprisonment. Two were acquitted. Clark received life with a 20-year 
minimum. He died of a heart attack in Parkhurst Prison in 1983. 
   The effect of the collapse of Clark's drug empire was a dramatic drop 
in the availability of heroin in New Zealand. Clark was not the only opera-
tor but his arrest, which had been preceded by the arrests of several other 
big importers in the mid-to late 1970s, had a resounding impact on big-time 
heroin importation. Heroin seizures, which had peaked at nearly 2000 grams 
in 1978, almost disappeared in the early 1980s. Imported cannabis also van-
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ished and was replaced by hemp grown domestically. Although imported 
heroin remained comparatively rare, by 1984 it too had been replaced from 
another source: ` homebaked' heroin and morphine manufactured in back-
yard laboratories from codeine-based analgesics. 
4. Outlaw Gangs 
   So the demise of the Mr Asia gangdid not result in the end of illegal 
drug abuse in New Zealand. All it did was alter the sources of such drugs. 
And by the same token, the Mr Asia arrests did not signal the end of orga-
nized crime either. From the late 1970s onward, organized crime increas-
ingly became the province of outlaw gangs. 
   Loose gangs of youths bearing such names as the `Petone Rebels', 
`Curries' Cowboys' and the ` Saints', had begun forming in New Zealand in 
the mid-1950s (Howman, 1972: 229; Yska, 1993:144). But these disorga-
nized groups lacked a formal structure, and remained so until 1961 when a 
chapter of the Hell's Angels Motorcycle Club (HAMC) was established in 
Auckland. The Hell's Angels had initially formed in San Bernadino, Cali-
fornia, in 1948. Chapters in San Francisco and Oakland followed in the 
1950s. HAMC (Auckland) was the fourth chapter of the Hell's Angels, and 
it was the first chapter to be established outside of California (Lavigne, 
1987: 61-62).  It was not long before other patched gangs, such as Highway 
61, the Road Knights, the Epitaph Riders, and the Mongrel Mob, also be-
came a part of the New Zealand social scene. 
    Initially the Californian Hell's Angels was purely an ` outlaw' motor-
cycle club, soon gaining a profile for toughness and violence but apparently 
lacking connections in organized criminal activity (Thompson, 1970). How-
ever, having come into contact with LSD through its association with writ-
ers like Hunter S. Thompson and Ken Kesey in the mid-1960s (Woolfe, 
1981), the Angels realized that huge profits could be made from trafficking 
in the drug. This was especially so after LSD became illegal in America in 
1966. By contacting the principal LSD source of the time, Augustus Owsley 
Stanley 111, the Angels managed to corner a large section of a lucrative 
market. It is from about this time, the late 1960s, that the gang's organized 
criminal activity began. Incorporating in California in 1966, HAMC (Inc) 
soon transformed itself from a motorcycle gang to an international drug 
trafficking network. Its principal drugs of trade were LSD (acid), PCP (an-
gel dust), and methamphetamine (crank) (Lavigne, 1987: 91-92) 
    The movement of HAMC (Auckland) into organizedcriminal activity
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occurred some years later. Until the mid-1970s, HAMC (Auckland) was a 
gang of traditional type, whose activities principally revolved around bikes, 
booze, women and the odd turf war with other gangs. Indeed, a prolifera-
tion of gangs had occurred in the 1970s, leading to a number of well publi-
cized incidents of mob violence (see Howman, 1972: 238-9; Kelsey and 
Young: 1982). In December 1975, during a dispute with the Highway 61 
gang over a woman, a Highway member called Bradley Haora was shot and 
killed. A major police investigation led to manslaughter convictions for a 
dozen HAMC members, and sentences of up to ten years. 
   The Haora killing was a significant milestone for the Auckland Hell's 
Angels. Apart from the twelve on the manslaughter counts, several others 
were also in prison on different charges. With a membership of less than 
25, this meant that more than half of its complement was now locked up. 
The group's core was confined in New Zealand's maximum security prison 
at Paremoremo, near Auckland. Here also, the country's most serious crimi-
nals were held, including a number who were serving long terms for major 
drug trafficking offences. The population of Paremoremo was less than 200 
so it was inevitable that close relationships among inmates developed. The 
Angels became involved in bookmaking, and small-time drug distribution 
within the prison. By the time they started getting released in the late 1970s, 
many of them had formed friendships with members of New Zealand's crimi-
nal underworld. It is likely that the gang's involvement in organized com-
mercial crime dates from about this time. 
   By the end of 1980 the Californian Angels had been dealing crank, 
acid, cocaine and other drugs for well over a decade and had become a 
worldwide organization, with 47 chapters in ten different countries (Lavigne, 
1987:  61-63). The international brotherhood was strong and when the 
Auckland group commenced ealing, its main supply source was in Cali-
fornia. By 1980, members of the Auckland Hell's Angels were involved in 
the selling of crank and LSD. Early in the 1980s the gang was prosperous 
enough to afford a large piece of real estate and a spacious house in the 
expensive Auckland suburb of Mt Eden. A number of Angels came under 
investigation for drug dealing activities. One of the first to be charged was 
Chris Hartley, the Angel who had pulled the trigger on Bradley Haora in 
1975 and who was not long out of prison. In April 1984 Hartley was sen-
tenced to 61/2 years for trafficking in LSD. Further evidence of the Angels' 
international inks came in 1986, when about 100 members of chapters 
around the world attempted to enter New Zealand to celebrate the Auckland
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chapter's 25th anniversary (New Zealand Herald, 30 June 1986). A second 
international gathering was held for the  group's 30th anniversary in 1991. 
   In 1981 a governmental Committee on Gangs reported that according 
to police, there were at least 80 different gangs or gang chapters in New 
Zealand, with approximately 2300 members (Committee on Gangs, 1981: 
5-6). By this time the modern gang profile had been established, with three 
types of gangs identified: outlaw motorcycle gangs, numbering 20, with 
630 members; Maori and Polynesian ethnic gangs, with 57 different chap-
ters and 1650 members, and an unknown number of white ethnic gangs. In 
1987, a second police gang survey estimated 2200 gang members in 44 
distinct gangs (New Zealand Herald, 7 March 1987). The following year 
the estimate had doubled, to 4400, in 45 gangs. members The largest gang 
was said to be the Mongrel Mob, with 670, followed by the Black Power 
with 413, the Devil's Henchmen with 108, and the Storm Troopers with 50 
(Press, 26 September 1988). By 1989 the police gang estimate had increased 
to 5356 members and associates, 3041 of them fully patched. The Mob's 
strength was said to have increased to 1630, of whom 741 were patched 
(Christchurch Star, 29 November 1989). 
   Like the Hell's Angels, thereis good evidence that some of the larger 
New Zealand gangs became more organized in the 1980s as well. Perhaps 
the most successful was an Auckland chapter which had formed under the 
name `Sindis' in 1976 and joined with Black Power two years later. In 1980 
the chapter formed a charitable trust known as 'Tatau Te lwi' (We, the 
People) (O'Reilly, 1986). By exploiting government employment-incen-
tive handouts and gang labour, by 1986 the chapter had developed multi-
million dollar assets including legitimate haulage, labour hire, security, and 
travel companies in Auckland. It owned a $600,000 clubhouse in South 
Auckland and had purchased other properties for locating factories. It also 
had two limousines and a large number of Harley Davidson motorcycles 
imported from California (Sunday Star, 17 August 1986) 
    Until they were closed down in 1987, other gangs made use of these 
grants for contract work schemes as well. In Christchurch, the South Island's 
largest city (population: 307,000), Black Power received $483,000 in work-
scheme payments in 1985 and 1986. The Christchurch chapter of Highway 
61 received $214,000, the Mongrel Mob's chapter, $179,000. So in all, 
around $800,000 a year in government money was being spent on gang-
related schemes in Christchurch alone (New Zealand Herald, 28 January 
1987).
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    The Mongrel Mob, which had existed informally since 1956, profited 
least from the tapping of public resources. Fragmented and still only semi-
organized, it continued to commit principally low or zero profit offences 
such as rapes, beatings, intimidation, debt collecting, burglaries, robberies 
and murders. Efforts to improve its tawdry image failed dismally.  In De-
cember 1986 an attempt by the Mob to legitimize itself failed when a highly 
publicized national gang convention ended in an even more highly publi-
cized gang rape. Partly as a result of this, an attempt o arrange a $2 million 
deal from the Middle East to finance job training schemes fell through (New 
Zealand Herald, 4 February 1987). In January 1987 and January 1989, gov-
ernment-funded work-skills vehicles owned by Mongrel Mob charitable 
trusts were used to commit armed holdups (New Zealand Herald, 8 January 
1987; 6 January 1989). Later in 1989, an attempt o link up with outlaw 
gangs in Western Australia, ended with the Australian gangs denouncing 
the Mob as troublemakers and seeking to have them deported (Christchurch 
Star, 29 November 1989) 
   The failed criminal activity of these larger gangs is reflected in prison 
population figures. At the end of the 1980s, a quarter of all prison inmates 
were gang members or associates. Of these, half belonged to the Mongrel 
Mob and almost a third to Black Power. Members of motorcycle gangs only 
accounted for about eleven percent of gang members in prison (Meek, 1992: 
267). In 1987, reflecting the high Mongrel Mob presence, 56.1 percent of 
all gang members were serving time for violence, as opposed to 38.5 per-
cent of non gang-affiliated inmates. On the other hand, gang members were 
only 3.3 percent of those doing time for drugs compared with 10.3 percent 
of the non gang-affiliated (Braybrook and O'Neill , 1988: 64). A later sur-
vey conducted in 1995 found that the percentage of gang affiliation in prison 
had dropped to 16 percent, but gang members were still more likely to be 
doing time for violence and than the unaffiliated, and were still less likely 
to be incarcerated for drugs (Lash 1996: 41-44). 
   These figures notwithstanding, certain gangs have continued to be in-
volved in drug dealing. As the recession deepened in the 1980s, numerous 
individuals, not all of them gang members, resorted to drug dealing as a 
source of income. Reported cannabis trafficking offences grew by 56 per-
cent between 1980 and 1989. The amount of cannabis leaf seized more than 
doubled. Cash-cropping of marijuana became an important source of in-
come in certain depressed rural areas such as the far north, the Coromandel 
Peninsula and the East Coast of the North Island . Reflecting this, the num-
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ber of plants seized annually escalated even more rapidly than seizures of 
cannabis leaf. There were more than five times as many plants seized in 
1989 than there were in 1980. Official figures are not broken down into 
drug groups, but the number of non-cannabis dealing offences reported in 
the 1980s also grew, by 45 percent, in this period. There were major co-
caine seizures in 1987 and 1988, and large LSD seizures in 1989. 
   Exactly how much of these rises can be attributed to the gangs, how 
much to other organized criminal groups, and how much to un-organized 
crime, we can only speculate about. But police believe that during the 1990s, 
the Hell's Angels have continued to be a principal source of LSD and meth-
amphetamine in New Zealand, and that they distribute such drugs to other 
gangs. Gangs not linked in with the Angels, such as Highway 61 and cer-
tain chapters of Black Power, sell marijuana through holes in the walls of 
their clubhouse enclosures. Many gangs are also a source of illegal fire-
arms. These are often obtained through burglaries of the premises of known 
firearms owners. Another source, especially since the breakup of the Soviet 
Union, is sailors from Eastern Europe, who are able to purchase handguns 
relatively cheaply in their home countries and get a good price for them in 
New Zealand. Many of these weapons are sold to, or end up in the hands o 
f, gang members. In addition to criminal activity, however, a number of 
gangs also have interests in legitimate tax-paying enterprises uch as night 
clubs, massage parlours and motorcycle spare parts outlets. 
    A feature of the 1990s has been a tendency for gangs to corporatize 
and internationalize in order to maximize profit. In doing so, they have 
adopted the same globalization strategies that have been taken by legiti-
mate businesses around the world. By 1987 the Hells Angels had at least 
1000 members worldwide, distributed among 67 chapters in 13 countries 
on four continents (Lavigne, 1987: 61). The Hell's Angels are now consid-
ered the wealthiest and most powerful of the motorcycle gangs in America, 
followed by the Outlaws, the Pagans and the Bandidos. Together they num-
ber 3000 members and represent the largest criminal organization i  America. 
Of these `Big Four', only the Pagans do not have international connections 
(Kenney and Finkenauer, 1995 : 293-4). 
    The Big Four are all involved in a wide variety of crimes such as manu-
facturing and/ or dealing in LSD, PCP, cocaine and methamphetamine. This 
is said to be the biggest money maker of the outlaw motorcycle gangs 
(OMGS), which control at least 40 percent of the Unites States metham-
phetamine supply (Kenney and Finkenauer, 1995: 296). OMGS also deal in
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weapons and stolen motorcycle parts, and have reportedly provided fire-
arms, bombs and 'muscle' to traditional organized criminals (Abadinsky, 
1990: 227). There is, in fact, good evidence that organized criminal groups 
in America frequently  `franchise' some of their criminal business to other 
groups in this way (Albanese and Pursley, 1993: 65). 
    International amalgamation is another strategy which has become in-
creasingly noticeable among OMGS in the 1990s. In 1993 Hell's Angels 
MC World, Outlaws MC World and Bandidos MC World were reported to 
have set up a corporate global takeover plan. During the 1990s the Hell's 
Angels have registered four companies bearing their name in Great Britain, 
and have established Hell's Angels (Europe) Ltd to control the use of trade 
marks such as the death's head logo and to run concerts and bike shows 
(New Zealand Herald, 16 October 1996). In Sydney, Australia, it is reported 
that a meeting of OMGS in 1994 decided that by the year 2000, the country 
should be controlled by six gangs: the Hell's Angels , the Outlaws, the 
Bandidos, the Rebels, the Black Uhlans and the Nomads. 
   It appears that within New Zealand a similar process may be taking 
place. It has been reported that Highway 61 is on the verge of buying into 
the Bandidos MC World's Australian franchise (Dominion, 24 June 1996). 
But the best organized gang in New Zealand is still the Hell's Angels Mo-
torcycle Club. Numbering about 20, the HAMC is tight and loyal, and its 
public profile is low. It has international credibility and a long association 
with the most powerful gang in the United States. Seldom, nowadays, do its 
members appear in court. Seldom is it involved in the types of inter-gang 
strife which draws attention to other gangs such as the Mongrel Mob, Black 
Power, the Road Knights and the Epitaph Riders. Sophisticated, unpreten-
tious, well-attired and polite to its neighbours, HAMC (Auckland) is a pro-
totype of the successful gang of the future. 
   For some years, the Hells' Angels have sought to expand their sphere 
of influence from their base in Auckland. To some extent, this endeavour 
has been frustrated by a loose union of half a dozen or so gangs called ` The 
Federation', which has resisted the Angels' advances. In 1992, however, 
the HAMC began prospecting in the small North Island town of Wanganui, 
forming a chapter there in 1994. Already having established business links 
with a number of North Island gangs, in 1995 it is believed that they began 
looking for a drug-distribution base in the South Island. The group they 
chose to work with was the Road Knights MC. The Road Knights are a 
small motorcycle club which formed in the South Island town of Timaru in
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the late 1970s. The gang now has chapters in other South Island towns such 
as Christchurch, Dunedin and Invercargill, and interests in at least three 
registered companies. In Christchurch, where approximately 14 Road 
Knights live, the gang is also closely associated with a small group of neo-
fascist teenagers known as the Bandenkreig, who often contract hemselves 
out to the Knights. 
   The most violent gang in the South Island, during the 1990s the Knights 
or their associates have been involved in beatings, drive-by shootings, ar-
sons, robberies and in 1991, the bombing of a police station. Given its high 
profile, the Angels' choice of partner in their South Island venture is sur-
prising. According to police intelligence, initially the Knights were pro-
vided with cheap methamphetamine (or `white powder') to allow them to 
cut out their opposition. This caused friction with other gangs, in particular 
with the Epitaph Riders, an old Christchurch gang which had formed in 
1969. Conflict soon led to gunfire, with a number of drive-by shootings in 
Christchurch streets in the early part of 1996. Nobody was seriously injured 
in these incidents, until April, when a female bystander was wounded in the 
chest by a .45 pistol shot fired by a Road Knights associate. 
   The result was a vigorous police crackdownon Road Knights activity 
which resulted, for example, in gang members receiving $13,000 in traffic 
offence notices in the months immediately following the April shooting. In 
1996, 23 Road Knights members were sent to prison, including three jailed 
in relation to the shoot ing. 
   On 1996 police estimates, there are around 42 different gangs in New 
Zealand, comprising around 5000 members. The frequently violent crimi-
nal activity of the gangs is attested to by the fact that around 750 gang 
members and associates are currently in prison, most of them for crimes of 
violence (Lash, 1996: 43-44). Between 1994 and 1996, Road Knights mem-
bers alone were convicted of nearly 2000 separate offences (Press, 10 Sep-
tember 1996). Apart from a number of assaults, stabbings, shootings, rob-
beries, rapes and murders, in 1995 and 1996 New Zealand gang members 
were arrested for LSD and marijuana trafficking, and for the manufacture 
of methamphetamine. 
    A very recent development has been the apparent linking of gangs with 
members of Asian crime syndicates. According to police intelligence, Black 
Power, the Mongrel Mob, the Headhunters, the King Cobras and the Satan's 
Slaves have all liaised with Asian organized crime groups in recent years 
and may have been doing so for some time (Fiso, 1996). perhaps the most
            Chapter 15 ORGANIZED CRIME IN NEW ZEALAND299 
disturbing of these associations has been that between the Mongrel Mob 
and the Hong Kong-based 14K triad. In April 1996, police say, 14K offered 
the Mob $140,000 to kill Api Fiso, the coordinator of the Asian Crime Unit 
in Wellington  (Press, 19 November 1996 ). The implication of such devel-
opments for this country's law enforcement strategy will be addressed later 
in the chapter. 
                5. Organized Asian Crime 
    Immigrants of Asian extraction have beenpart of New Zealand's popu-
lation since the early days of formal colonization. When gold was first dis-
covered in New Zealand in 1861, large numbers of Chinese entered the 
country to work in the goldfields and many of them remained after the rushes 
had subsided. In 1881, out of a total population of 534,000, there were more 
than 5000 Chinese resident in New Zealand (Department of Statistics, 1990: 
127, 188). 
   Although discriminated against by a variety of legislation (see Depart-
ment of Statistics 1990: 158), the New Zealand Chinese have always been 
largely a law-abiding people whose principal vice up until the end of the 
1960s appeared to be the smoking, by some, of opium. With the 1970s and 
the pressure which came upon drug abuse generally, however, the opium 
habits of old Chinese were largely extinguished. 
   For most of this century, the numbers of ethnic Chinese grew only 
gradually, reaching 20,000, or.6 percent of the population, in 1986. After 
that, however, as a result of the opening up of the borders of mainland China, 
and nervousness in Hong Kong and Taiwan over the impending transfer of 
Hong Kong to communist rule in 1997, a huge exodus of Chinese occurred 
to the nations of the West. A number of. these migrants came to New Zealand. 
Thus, the Chinese population in New Zealand almost doubled between 1986 
and 1991, to 44,800 (1.3 percent). In the census of 1991, 30 percent of all 
migrants living in New Zealand had been born in Asia . This made Asians 
(including Indians) New Zealand's largest migrant group. At the time of 
writing (February 1997), 1996 census data were not available but between 
1991 and 1995, the number of North Asians approved for residency in New 
Zealand grew from 10,564 to 24,519. This amounted to 44 percent of all 
residency approvals. In 1996, as a result of tighter residency rules, the num-
ber of North Asian permits dropped to 14,716, or 34.8 percent of all ap-
provals. That year, the largest sources of Asian migrants were China, South 
Korea and Taiwan, in that order (Young, 1996). The bulk of Asians now
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live in the three major cities: Auckland (57.1 percent ), Wellington (16.3 
percent) and Christchurch (6.8 percent) (Statistics New Zealand, 1994: 44). 
   With the idea of boosting local business with injections of capital,New 
Zealand's `Business Investment Policy' of 1987 welcomed migrants who 
had sufficient business capital and investment skills to make a positive con-
tribution to the New Zealand economy. Many Chinese, especially those 
from Hong Kong, Taiwan and Malaysia, fell into this category. But a frac-
tion of those who entered under the business provision had fortunes which 
had been made through involvement with organized crime. They maintained 
links with such crime on arriving in New Zealand and thus, organized Asian 
crime became an issue for the country. 
   As noted, the existenceof a specifically Asian component o orga-
nized crime was formally recognized in New Zealand in 1987. The country's 
first Asian Crime Units were established in Wellington and Auckland in 
1991, and a third was set up in Christchurch in 1996. Wellington's facility 
now has two detectives assigned to it, Auckland has three detectives, and 
Christchurch as one (Fiso, 1997). The senior coordinating officer, Api Fiso, 
holds the rank of Detective Sergeant. 
    At first, the existence of organized Asian crime groups remained barely 
noticed by the New Zealand public. But by September 1991 the police were 
aware of the existence of triad gangs, which were involved in drugs, prosti-
tution, credit card fraud and extortion (Dominion, 10 September 1996). By 
the end of 1991, the Customs Department knew that around 20 triad mem-
bers, six of them ` highly ranked', were resident in New Zealand (Domin-
ion, 27 January 1992). 
    As a result of this and other faults in immigration policy, in the 1990s 
the government passed a number of amendments to the Immigration Act 
1987. In 1991 a ` points' system was introduced, by which the suitability of 
residency applicants could be measured according to a range of criteria. At 
the same time, the Business Investment Policy was replaced with a ` Busi-
ness Investment Category'. The purpose of these and other amendments 
was to tighten restrictions on immigration by closer scrutiny of the charac-
ter of applicants, and to be more prescriptive about financial and business 
requirements. The amendments ought to ensure that entrepreneurial mi-
grants were bona fide businesspeople who would actively invest heir money 
in New Zealand for a minimum period of time. 
    Whether the amendments did in factprevent he entry of more syndi-
cated criminals or not, is a matter for debate. Certainly, triad-associated
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persons have been in New Zealand for at least two decades. One of the 
earliest-known individuals with triad connections is a person I will call Y
, 
who entered New Zealand in 1973. Although he denies he is a member of a 
triad, Y admits he has known Ma Man-Chuen, a senior member of the 14K 
Triad in Hong Kong, for 20 years. Y once acted as foster father to  Man-
Chuen's son. In 1989, during friction with the Wo triad in Wellington
, a 
number of 14K members were recruited from Britain and together with 
local members, they smashed up a Wellington restaurant owned by the Wo 
group and attacked staff. As a result of this incident, Y was arrested for 
assault with a weapon and fined $4000. 
    14K, which had changed its namefrom `Hong Yee' upon moving to 
Hong Kong from Guangzhou after 1949 (Deputy Director, 1996: 18), is 
currently the third largest triad in Hong Kong (Harrington, 1997). This group 
is also one of the most powerful in New Zealand. First coming to police 
attention in 1987, when it was involved in the importation of heroin to Aus-
tralia, 14K has since been associated with more drug trafficking, as well as 
with gambling, assaults, passport forgery and illegal shellfish smuggling. 
   There are two other triad-style groups in New Zealand: San Yee On 
and the Wo group. 
   San Yee On, like 14K, has its origins in China. Currently the largest 
triad in Hong Kong with 47,000 members (Deputy Director, 1996), the group 
is reputed to have forged alliances with corrupt officials in the People's 
Republic of China. Since the departure of its New Zealand leader in 1992, 
San Yee On is believed to be leaderless here, but remains in control of a 
gambling den in Auckland and retains contact with its counterparts in Hong 
Kong (Fiso, 1996). 
   The Wo group is in stronger shape, and one of its factional leaders is a 
retired Hong Kong policeman. The group is active in car theft, receiving, 
prostitution, drug smuggling, and shellfish smuggling. Since its confronta-
tion with the 14K in 1989, the Wo group is believed to have declined in 
Wellington and now operates principally from Auckland (Fiso, 1996). 
   In addition to the triads, a number of other Asian organized crime rings 
have links with New Zealand. Vietnamese migrants, for example, many of 
whom came to New Zealand as refugees under a United Nations charter, 
have been involved in prostitution, gambling, and heroin importation. Young 
Asian migrants, sent to New Zealand for education by their wealthy par-
ents, have been associated with dealing in false passports and, as has been 
experienced in Australia, are believed to be vulnerable to recruitment into
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organized crime groups (Fiso, 1996). 
   From Singapore and Malaysia are the Ah Kong group and its offshoot, 
Singma. Although of little influence in New Zealand so far, Ah Kong is 
highly active in drug smuggling in Europe, and both have been involved in 
heroin smuggling in Australia since at least 1990. Since at least 1994, intel-
ligence suggests that Ah Kong has also had drug smuggling links with New 
Zealand. In 1995, information was received by the police about the pres-
ence of a high-ranking Ah Kong member from Belgium (Fiso, 1996). 
   The final group which has had a presence in New Zealand in recent 
years is what Japanese officially call `Boryokudan' (`violent ones'), but 
who are known to themselves as ` Yakuza', after a worthless hand in a card 
game (Abadinsky, 1990: 247-8). Yakuza is actually a collective name for 
approximately 24 major groups which operate in Japan and elsewhere. With 
collective membership of 79,300 in 1995, the Boryokudan is the largest 
organized crime group in the world (Uchiyama, 1996: 2). 
   Boryokudan groups have significant links with legitimate business in 
Japan and also have well-known connections in Japanese politics. Outside 
of Japan, Boryokudan are involved in a variety of activities such as vio-
lence, prostitution, gun smuggling, as well as a great deal of legitimate busi-
ness. Although there is little evidence of major activity in New Zealand, 
several Boryokudan have entered or attempted to enter the country, one 
with $US85,000 in his pocket. The principal activity of Boryokudan in New 
Zealand is thought o be money laundering, and there has been some evi-
dence of prostitution as well (Fiso, 1996). 
    To date, Asian crime in New Zealand ha s had a number o f manifesta-
tions. There were major heroin seizures in New Zealand in 1987, 1991 and 
1993. Almost all of the significant heroin seizures ince 1987, in fact, have 
involved Asian criminals from identified criminal networks. A number of 
other Asian crime figures have been arrested overseas or been involved in 
trafficking heroin to Australia via New Zealand (Fiso, 1996). 
    Apart from drugs, organized Asian groups have been involved in gam-
bling dens and the manufacture and importation of counterfeit gambling 
chips. Since 1993, such groups have also increasingly engaged in crimes of 
violence. Between 1991 and 1995 there was more than a 200 percent in-
crease in the number of Asians apprehended for violence. Greatest areas of 
growth have occurred in the areas of assaults, robbery, and intimidation and 
threats. A number of cases of kidnapping for the purposes of extortion, and 
other forms of extortion, have been notified to the police since 1993.
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 Throughout New Zealand, Asian criminal groups have become involved in 
 organized burglary, shoplifting and motor vehicle theft, and with the  `fenc-
 ing' of stolen goods. Police intelligence indicates that overseas criminal 
 methods are being passed on to, and adopted by, local criminals (Fiso, 1996).     Si
nce 1993, the counterfeiting of money and credit cards has been iden-
 tified on a number of occasions and several arrests have been made. Pass-
 port fraud, too, has been detected, together with attempts to smuggle aliens 
 in to the country. Many such persons arrive with false or forged travel docu-
 ments to work as prostitutes in urban massage parlours. 
    The impact of Asian organized crime is also being felt in juvenile of-
fending. Youth gangs are forming along ethnic lines, principally: Hong Kong 
Chinese, mainland Chinese, Taiwanese, Vietnamese, Malaysian, Japanese 
and Thai. In schools, tensions between different Asian groups, or between 
Asians and non-Asians, are being met with some students resorting to the 
use of offensive weapons uch as nunchakas, softball bats, hatchets, knives 
and firearms. In a number of cases, youths arrested as a result of confronta-
tions have connections with known organized crime figures (Fiso
, 1996). Th
ere is also evidence that schools are being used as recruiting grounds for 
Asian organized crime, and that schoolboy gangsters are extorting 'protec-
tion money' from the wealthy families of other students (New Zealand H
er-
ald, 17 October 1996). 
    It is in the last twoor three years that crime by Asians in New Zealand 
has become of significant importance in this country. The number of Asians 
apprehended by police rose gradually after 1990, but in 1995, the number 
of Asians apprehended was nearly eight times greater than in 1994
, and 
almost equal to the total of all Asian offenders apprehended in the previous 
fourteen years. In 1996 6.4 percent of all apprehended offenders were Asians, 
making them the country's second-most likely offenders on a per capita 
basis, behind the Maori (Fiso, 1996). 
   As already noted, evidence of liaisons between organized Asian groups 
and established street gangs has recently emerged in New Zealand as well. 
Twice in 1996, Asians have attempted to contract local criminals to kill 
police officers, and there has been one drug-related plot to murder a police-
man in the small town of Taumarunui. With only 24 law enforcement offic-
ers killed in the 110-year history of the New Zealand Police
, these new d
evelopments are giving considerable concern.
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                   6. Control Measures 
   Over the past 30 years, a number of steps have been taken to control 
organized crime in New Zealand. 
   A. Drugs 
   To combat the drug threat of the 1970s several legislative develop-
ments occurred. In 1975, controlled drugs were divided into three classes: 
A, B and C, and in 1978 penalties were stiffened so that trafficking Class A 
drugs - which now include heroin, LSD and cocaine - carry a maximum life 
penalty. That penalty has been awarded three times (and upheld twice) since 
the new law came into effect. Trafficking Class B drugs, such as hashish, 
morphine, opium and amphetamine, r tained the 14-year maximum and Class 
C drugs - such as cannabis plant, codeine and the barbiturates - had their 
maximums cut to eight years. 
   In 1975 police were given the power to search for drugs without a 
search warrant and in 1978 the use of tracking and listening devices for 
detecting drug offenders was given. Intelligence was also improved, with 
the establishment of a National Drug Intelligence Bureau in 1972 and the 
posting of a permanent Drug Liaison Officer in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1978. 
A second liaison officer was appointed in Sydney in 1980. Later, as the 
importation of drugs from Southeast Asia declined and domestically-pro-
duced drugs took their place, helicopters were employed to search for drug 
plantations in remote, bush-clad areas. 
    More recently, and not just related to drug dealing, the Proceeds of 
Crime Act 1991 has been passed, allowing asset seizure when a person has 
been convicted of an offence punishable by more than five years imprison-
ment and when a High Court judge believes the assets to have been accu-
mulated as a result of crime. In 1995 an amendment to the Crimes Act made 
money laundering an offence in New Zealand. The following year, the Fi-
nancial Transactions Report ing Act made financial institutions responsible 
for reporting suspicious financial activity to the police.
   B. Gangs 
   Where outlaw street gangs are concerned, there has been little formal 
response. In 1972, the Leader of the Opposition's proposal for Parliament 
to `take the bikes off the bikies' as a controlling strategy was ignored on 
practical and human rights advice. The approach of police to the gangs has 
largely been one of tolerance within the boundaries of the law. Strategy has
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been to police gangs in the normal context of law enforcement, rather than 
to target hem and try to wipe them out. The most likely consequence of a 
repression strategy would be to force the gangs underground, and thus make 
their activities more difficult to monitor. 
    Where the illegal profile of a particular gang grows unacceptably high, h
owever, or the gang is considered to be becoming a public menace in its 
own right, rigorous short-term harassment operations are common. In 1995, 
for example, a campaign against he Nomads in the North Island's Wairarapa 
district resulted in arrests of 40 gang members or associates and the even-
tual imprisonment of the gang's leaders. It will be recalled that in 
Christchurch in 1996, an operation specifically targetting the Road Knights 
also resulted in dozens of arrests, and thousands of dollars in traffic fines. 
    In 1989, amendments to the Criminal Justice Act and the Summary 
Offences Act allowed the courts to impose non-association orders on con-
victed persons and empowered the police to disperse assemblies which 
threaten public order. The specific objective of the latter provision was to 
limit gang activity by giving the police greater powers to move gang mem-
bers even though they had not committed an offence. Late in 1996 the Ha-
rassment and Criminal Associations Bill came before parliament. Designed 
to provide police with greater powers to combat gangs, the bill makes it 
easier for police to use listening devices and search vehicles, it extends 
their powers to remove gang fortifications, and it seeks to outlaw member-
ship in gangs known to engage in criminal activity. It remains to be seen 
whether these proposals will all remain after scrutiny from parliament's 
justice and law reform select committee.
   C. Asian Crime 
   Asian crime is a recent phenomenon, with the existence o f dedicated 
Asian intelligence units less than a decade old . Apart from the six  detec-
tives in Asian intelligence units , Asian crime portfolios are now held by 
detectives in four North Island and two South Island towns . By the begin-
ning of 1997, the police still had no Asian or Chinese-speaking person at-
tached to their units, due to the absence of any suitably-qualified staff within 
the force. However, a specific attempt was being made to equip staff with 
skills in Mandarin, Japanese and Thai languages . A number of bilingual 
Asian officers had been recruited and there were officers working within 
their communities with the appropriate language skills . Training and infor-
mation lectures were being given in a variety of police training courses
, and
 306T1HU :31J3 
since 1994, a number of New Zealand police officers had attended orga-
nized crime-related conferences overseas (Fiso, 1996; pers. 35 comm.). 
   At the same time, a systematic attempt was being made at coordinat-
ing training and intelligence at a national level, in particular with other de-
partments such as Customs, Immigration, Inland Revenue, Security Intelli-
gence, and Agriculture and Fisheries. An immigrant database had been cre-
ated. English language entry requirements were being tightened, and com-
munity group sponsorship had been abolished. Several government depart-
ments had officers working  fulltime on intelligence and investigations re-
lating to Asian organized crime. These and other agencies were coordinat-
ing their activities and knowledge in order to maximize the state's capacity 
to deal with the emerging problem of organized crime in New Zealand. 
            7. Evaluation of Anti-Crime Measures
The success of the measures has been variable.
   A. Drugs 
   As noted, the steps taken in the 1970s to deal with drug importation 
were extremely effective. By the end of 1979 the Mr Asia gang had been 
destroyed, with most of its members either dead or in prison. Certainly, the 
bulk of arrests took place in Australia or England, but prosecution cases 
were enhanced by multi-national police cooperation, including input from 
New Zealand. In New Zealand itself, combined customs and police intelli-
gence was so effective that during the 1970s a number of major importers 
of cannabis and heroin were apprehended. Heavy sentences were imposed, 
even for relatively small amounts of drug. We have seen that as a result, the 
commercial viability of drug importation dropped to the point that by 1980, 
the ingress of heroin and marijuana to New Zealand had virtually ceased. 
For the same reason, cocaine has never featured as a significant problem. 
   But staunching the flow of foreign drugs into New Zealand did not 
stop the availability of controlled substances. As noted, by the early 1980s 
backyard laboratories had begun manufacturing opiates from codeine, and 
a lively market for pharmaceutical nalgesics uch as palfium, pethidine, 
omnipon and non-injectable morphine (MST) developed. MST is easily 
converted to injectable morphine by treating it with ascetic anhydride and 
bicarbonate of soda. Thus, a small drug addiction problem exists in New 
Zealand. Currently there are 2500 opiod dependent patients on registered 
methadone treatment (Sellman et al, 1996: 1) and every year, according to
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 police reports, about 15 people die from drug overdoses. But few of these 
 deaths are due to abuse of traditionally feared drugs such as heroin and 
 morphine. In 1992, for example, a government report showed that in 1989 
 there were 25 deaths as a result of drug abuse. Only five of these were 
 caused by opioids, none were caused by cannabis or hallucinogens
, and 
 none were caused by barbiturates. The remaining 20 deaths were attributed 
 to unspecified  `other' drugs (Adams et al, 1992: 52). 
    The sealing of borders did not reduce marijuana use either; it may even 
 have stimulated it by creating a market for cheaper, domestically-grown 
cannabis. Between 1980 and 1995, the number of cannabis plants seized in 
New Zealand rose steadily, from 37,000 to 352,000: an increase of over 
900 percent. Neither have these massive seizures resulted in any apparent 
decline in cannabis use. The number of persons caught annually in posses-
sion of cannabis in New Zealand more than doubled in the same 15-year 
period, to 11,000. A recent report indicates that by age 19, at least 41 per-
cent of New Zealanders will have used cannabis at least once, whereas only 
nine percent will have tried hallucinogens, three percent, stimulants, and 
one percent, opiates (Adams, et al 1992: 28). Of fences concerning the rela-
tively benign drug, cannabis (Ministry of Health, 1995; 1996), constitute 
fully 93 percent of all drug crimes reported to the police. 
    The market for cannabis in New Zealand is thus huge, and the growing 
and distribution of it is of considerable conomic importance in some areas. 
It is this drug which forms a financial basis for many gang members who do 
not have access to more dangerous compounds uch as methamphetamine. 
As mentioned, the police adopt a low-profile approach to the majority of 
gang activity. It is reasonable that this should be so. If marijuana was re-
moved as a source of income to gangs and others whose livelihoods depend 
on it, other forms of perhaps more serious crime might result. paradoxi-
cally, therefore, the existence of a certain amount of marijuana production 
in New Zealand may be seen as a latent crime control feature in itself. 
   Police operations in marijuana distribution have had some effect on 
the availability and price of the drug, but may be less effective in the future. 
In the past, undercover officers assigned to marijuana investigations have 
had to engage fully with the marijuana trafficking culture in order to make 
arrests. Inevitably, this has involved them in smoking the drug and has ne-
cessitated official training in smoking techniques (see Ansley, 1995). Con-
sequently, however, by 1996 around 30 former officers were claiming to 
have become addicted to marijuana and some were admitting to having
 308 4M)IIitq- 31 4V; 3U 
perjured themselves in court when questioned about their drug-taking ac-
tivities. This development has thrown the drug undercover program into 
jeopardy.
   B. Gangs 
   According to police estimates cited earlier, gang numbers roughly 
trebled between 1981 and 1996. Such figures are only broad estimates, how-
ever, and do not take account of gang prospects and associates. Moreover, 
there is no way of assessing their accuracy. During the late 1980s, police 
gang estimates grew by roughly 28 percent, but have remained stable since 
1990. Numbers of patch members in prison have remained virtually un-
changed, at about 400, since 1987. However the prison population overall 
has increased so that the percentage of imprisoned gang members relative 
to non-gang members has almost halved during this time (Braybrook and 
O'Neill, 1988: 62; Braybrook and Southey, 1992: 70; Lash, 1996: 42). 
   But it is not the responsibility of police to reduce gang membership, 
since belonging to a gang is not itself an offence. Police are concerned, 
however, with the criminal activity which gangs may be involved in. As 
seen in the cases of the Nomads in the Wairarapa and the Road Knights in 
Christchurch, vigorous repression campaigns against high-profiled gangs 
are successful, but such pressure cannot be maintained without compromis-
ing police effectiveness in other areas. The violent profile of gangs is high, 
and in terms of gang members incarcerated for violence, that profile is in-
creasing. The ratio of gang members in prison serving time for a violent 
offence, relative to non-gang members, grew by 21 percent between 1987 
and 1991 (Braybrook and O'Neill, 1988: 64; Braybrook and Southey, 1992: 
72). Between 1988 and 1993, about four percent of all murders in New 
Zealand were gang-related (Miller, 1994 : 8). Homicides, however, have 
been declining since 1989 and robberies have stabilized since 1991. Con-
versely, grievous assaults have risen unremittingly, more than doubling since 
 1990. 
    The picture is thus far from simple, but it seems that the police do have 
 the gang problem largely under control. Neither now, nor never before,have 
 the gangs presented a significant threat to the stability of the countryor to 
 the welfare of the average New Zealander. That comment aside, changing 
 circumstances and recent intelligence about links between the gangs and 
 Asian crime, will require close monitoring.
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   C. Asian Crime 
   The Asiancrime problem has  really. only become significant in this 
country since 1993. To date, few police resources have been dedicated spe-
cifically to dealing with it. However, the coordination of inter-agency intel-
ligence nationwide has so far proven effective in keeping police aware of 
major developments. Whether greater resources will be necessary in the 
future will depend largely on how the situation progresses in the next few 
years.
8. The Future
    The police believe that in the future, Asian criminal groups will be-
come more visible in their activities. Particular areas of potential growth 
include fraud, serious violence, illegal immigration, extortion, vice, dis-
honesty, drug trafficking, gaming, and the illegal exploitation of fisheries 
(Fiso, 1996). If this occurs, it is also likely that stronger links with outlaw 
gangs may emerge, with increases in the their criminal effectiveness as a 
result. In a worst-case scenario, Asian groups could form functional alli-
ances with large violent gangs such as the Mongrel Mob, and develop a 
monopoly over criminal activities throughout the country. If gangs became 
organized at such a level, keeping control of serious crime could become 
extremely difficult. 
   There are several reasons why this is unlikely to happen. 
   Firstly, most gang members are highly visible. Maori gangs in particu-
lar, such as the Mongrel Mob and Black Power, advertise themselves through 
ostentatious forms of dress and extensive tattooing, particularly over the 
hands and face. Such men are unable to go anywhere in public without 
being noticed. Moreover, unlike Asians, gang members do not come from a 
subculture which is markedly distinct from that of the average New 
Zealander, and they are normally well-known within their own 
neighbourhoods. These factors severely limit the capacity of gangs to en-
gage in covert activity. 
   Secondly,apart from a few exceptions uch as the Hell's Angels, most 
gangs are disorganized and guileless, and much of their activity is incompe-
tent. The lucrative job schemes of the 1970s, for example, were lost to the 
gangs as a result of conspicuous exploitation by some and the use of gov-
ernment-funded vehicles for armed robberies. Indeed, the high numbers of 
gang members in prison for rapes, serious assaults, robberies and murders 
is itself testimony to their bungling efforts to make a life out of of crime.
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 Sophisticated  organizations  uch  as  triads  would be unlikely to profit from 
relying on gangs for support. It seems probable that Asian crime leaders 
will realize this quite quickly. 
   Thirdly, by themselves, Asian gangs are unlikely to gain a strong foot-
hold in this country. The reasons principally have to do with those factors 
outlined at the beginning of this chapter: New Zealand's remote insularity, 
the small size of its population, and the nature of its police force. In the 
United States in 1968 the President's Commission on Law Enforcement 
and the Administration of Justice declared that without corrupt officials, 
organized crime cannot exist (Schweizer, 1996: 8). One only has to look at 
areas in the world where organized crime has taken hold, such as Japan, 
Russia and Latin America, to find testimony to this statement. In the current 
chapter we have seen that Terry Clark was only able to survive in Australia 
for so long because of his relationship with corrupt government officials. 
    A recent worldwide survey by the Berlin-based organization, Trans-
parency International, has found New Zealand to be the least corrupt of all 
the countries studied (Dominion, 17 July 1995). I have argued earlier that 
systematic orruption is absent from the New Zealand Police. This situa-
tion will be significant in limiting the growth of organized crime in this 
country. The police are aware of the threat of corruption generally, and 
specifically of that presented by organized crime (Fiso, pers. comm). They 
are also aware of the need to create confidence among law-abiding immi-
grant groups that reports about intimidation or attempted extortion by crimi-
nals will not compromise the complainants and will be dealt with quickly 
and effectively. As police confidence within the Asian community grows, 
the arena within which Asian organized crime operates will be reduced. 
    In the late 1970s, large-scale hard drug-running activities byorganized 
groups were virtually eliminated from the New Zealand criminal scene. 
Today, the same factors which then restricted the viability of organized 
crime, still apply. This does not mean that New Zealanders can be compla-
cent about the re-emergence of organized crime in their country. What it 
does mean, however, is that with ongoing police vigilance, careful alloca-
tion of resources, and the continuation of inter-agency responses to devel-
opments in organized crime, the chances of major syndicated criminal groups 
taking root on New Zealand soil are slim.
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